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Introduction 
In late January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order banning non-
American citizens travelling into the United States from seven different countries. The title of the 
order was, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” As 
implied, the stated purpose was to limit the number of immigrants in order to avoid future 
attacks. Since the order took effect, people have argued against it, making claims about religious 
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and Islamophobia. Beyond the religious and ethnic issues, 
though, remains the question of efficacy. President Trump claims that the executive order is 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the United States’ immigrant vetting procedures and 
thus, protect the nation from terrorist incursion. In this way, he seeks to advance nationalist 
interests; his critics, meanwhile, assert that his actions are unfounded. Many in opposition to the 
executive order argue that immigration does not play a role in the spread of terrorism, claiming 
that no immigrants from these particular countries have carried out successful terror attack on the 
United States. For the order to serve a purpose, immigration must play a role in terrorism. Thus, 
the essential point of disagreement is whether a connection exists between the influx of 
migrants—especially those from terror-prone nations—and the occurrence of terrorist activity in 
the receiving nation. While there are a great deal of speculations and unfounded assertions on the 
possible link between immigration and terrorism, there have been few reliable, quantitative 
studies researching this question. The purpose of this study is to ameliorate the confusion caused 
by the dearth of research on this topic. In this study, we attempt to discover if a link exists 
between immigration from terror-prone nations and terrorism by examining the current literature 
and using data to analyze the levels of immigration as well as the incidents of terrorism in six 
countries.  
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Literature Review 
As the world grapples with the refugee crisis stemming from Syria and other war-torn 
nations and destitute regions, one of the most contentious immigration policy issues is whether 
increasing immigration will lead to increased terrorist activity. The rise of Islamic terrorism with 
Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria over the last several years and the 
recent terror attacks in Europe have brought concerns of importing terrorism through 
immigration into the minds of many policy leaders of western nations, especially those nations 
that receive many migrants from the Middle East and other traditionally Islamic regions.1   
 While there are many opinions on whether immigration causes terrorism and frequent 
debates on the subject in the news and halls of government, most of these opinions are supported 
by little more than anecdotal evidence.2 Until recently, little research existed on the topic and 
what did exist could not make strong claims on the politically polarized relationship between 
these two phenomena.  
Some experts claim that any connection between immigration and terrorism is illusory or 
fabricated.3 Authors of this opinion point to the lack of data showing a connection and the fact 
that immigration has been a significant issue long before the rise of terrorism in the last several 
decades.4 One author even surmises that a connection between the two phenomena has been 
promulgated with the intent of restricting immigration as an end, rather than as a means to 
                                               
1 Colette G. Mazzucelli, “Secular States in a “Security Community”: The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?” Journal of 
Strategic Security 9, no. 3, (2016): 21. 
2 Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78, no. 2 
(2016): 572.   
3 For example, see: Maria S. Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," European Journal on 
Criminal Policy & Research 13, no. 1/2 (2007): 57-72; Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory 
Correlation and Heuristic Mistake." Harvard Latino Law Review 10, (2007): 33-52; Mazzucelli, “Secular States in a 
“Security Community”: 16-27.   
4 Saux, "Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection," 71.  
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prevent terrorism.5 Another theory is that political leaders naturally transform complex, divisive 
questions into simple policy positions. 6 Essentially, the author argues that humans naturally 
substitute the “readiness with which [terrorism] comes to mind as a proxy for the probability” of 
it occurring.7 In the case of immigration, politicians and political pundits substitute the complex 
issues of immigration for simple questions of national security by promoting a fictitious 
connection between immigration—especially illegal immigration—and terrorism.8 However, 
psychological arguments that individuals are inclined to substitute simple issues or complex 
issues by creating illusory connections or that humans naturally treat immigration and terrorism 
as if they are correlated without any justifying research is only significant if terrorism and 
immigration are actually unconnected. This is not the case.   
 In fact, these views focus on how individuals make connections between immigration and 
terrorism without even considering the possibility that a connection exists. These authors silently 
discount several important research theories and studies that point to the opposite conclusion. 
Namely, that migration is a means through which terrorism is spread to previously unaffected 
nations and regions.9 However, not all migration is equally likely to lead to increased terrorism. 
A 2016 study showed that immigration in general was positively correlated with a decrease in 
terrorist activity in the receiving nation.10 The study also quantitatively demonstrated that, over 
30 years in 175 countries, an increase in immigration from a nation with high levels of terrorist 
activity was positively correlated with increased terrorist activity in the receiving nation.11 
                                               
5 Ibid.  
6. Mary De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," Harvard Latino 
Law Review 10, (2007): 34.  
7 Ibid, 35. 
8 Ibid, 33. 
9 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.   
10 Ibid, 572. 
11 Ibid. 
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Therefore, there is an empirical connection between immigration from terrorist-prone nations 
and the spread of terrorism to the country receiving the migrants.  
 However, some qualitative studies suggest that this finding cannot be true because 
refugees and migrants are unlikely to harbor terrorist sympathies as they are often attempting to 
flee conflicts created by terrorist or other violent groups.12 While the conclusion—that migration 
from terror-prone nations does not facilitate the spread of terrorism—is empirically false, it is 
worth considering the relevance of the claim that refugees and migrants would oppose, rather 
than support terrorism.  
First of all, even assuming that the mass majority of migrants have no intention of 
bringing terrorism into other nations, it is still possible that some do intend to do so. Given the 
damage even one such individual is able to inflict, the potential that a handful among thousands 
of migrants may harbor terrorist sentiments is a significant concern.  
Second, even assuming that most migrants are simply seeking a better life in a new 
nation, it is still possible that their movement facilitates the spread of terrorism. Bove and 
Bohmelt argue that the movement of migrants constitutes a physical link through which 
terrorism can spread from the terror-prone nation to the receiving nation.13 International 
diffusion and spatial dependency theories posit that regardless of the positive intentions of 
migrant groups, they can become a vehicle through which terrorism spreads from terrorist-prone 
nations to previously unaffected nations.14 Working in concert, international diffusion and social 
dependency theories suggest that migrants form strong social networks and diaspora 
communities that carry on the ideological, cultural, and ethnic heritage of their native countries. 
                                               
12 De Ming Fan, "The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake," 33-52. 
13 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575. 
14 Ibid, 575. 
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In the case of Muslim migrants, for example, even if the views migrants carry to their new 
countries are not in themselves radical or violent, the basic cultural and religious heritage they 
transport is still the foundation upon which radical Islamic terrorism is built. In essence, if the 
migrants are from a terrorist-prone nation, these networks and communities transplant the 
intellectual and cultural factors that contribute to the existence of terrorism in their native 
countries to their new country of residence. Additionally, research shows that these tight-knit 
expatriate groups are easily exploited for radicalization and recruitment by terrorists from their 
home country or culture.15 Terrorists can use communities of first and second generation 
migrants as hubs through which to expand their reach into other nations and regions by 
radicalizing and recruiting recent migrants, by using migrant communities to hide their presence 
in a foreign nation, or by using social capital build by the migrant communities to make 
ideological inroads into the native population.  
This concept is similar to the way any group might expand into a new area. The first step 
is to identify a promising new location for expansion; the second step is to identify current 
members of the group that already live in the area to help establish a foothold. However, instead 
of trying to spread a particular store or social club to a new region, terrorists are seeking to 
export their radical agendas to other nations. In this way, migrants are a vehicle through which 
terrorism is transplanted to regions in which it is not native. 
An example of this phenomena is Rinkeby, Sweden. Rinkeby is a neighborhood outside 
of Stockholm that contains a large quantity of migrants from Muslim Africa and the Middle 
East.16 Swedish police forces have identified the area as a primary recruiting ground for Somalia-
                                               
15 Ibid, 575. 
16 Robert Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” The Homeland Security 
Review 4, no. 3 (2010): 194. 
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based Islamic terrorist groups, such as Shebab.17 While the Swedish Security Forces consider the 
likelihood of an attack on Swedish soil as improbable, they are aware that radicalized Swedish 
nationals and Sweden-based migrants are traveling abroad to attend terrorist training camps and 
participate in acts of terror in foreign locales.18 This example demonstrates that terrorist groups 
are willing and able to infiltrate migrant, non-native populations and exploit their communities 
for radical ends—even if the migrants themselves were not originally radical. Shebab has used 
this tactic so effectively that it has been able to turn Sweden into an exporter of terrorism.  
 There are two additional considerations that make the potential for terrorist exploitation 
of migrant communities especially concerning in the case of Muslim and Arab diaspora 
communities. The first is that these groups are generally perceived as different from the peoples 
of the western nations to which they migrate. Therefore, Muslim migrants are commonly 
ostracized or perceive themselves as being ostracized from mainstream western society and have 
limited opportunity for assimilation, especially in Europe.19 The second aspect is related to the 
significant flood of immigrants that entered Europe as a result of the migrant crisis in 2016. 
Western Europe, for example, has largely failed to assimilate non-Caucasian migrants.20 
Research shows that terrorists view unassimilated peoples as being especially susceptible to 
radicalization due to the feelings of discontent and alienation fostered by their situation.21 Both 
of these considerations increase the possibility that, in spite of the good intentions of the majority 
of migrants, terrorist organizations will successfully manipulate the social networks migrants 
create to further their radical agendas.    
                                               
17 Ibid, 194.  
18 Ibid, 194-195.  
19 Ibid, 194. 
20 Ibid, 193. 
21 Jozsef Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues 5, no. 4 
(2016): 457. 
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Given that migrant communities are easily infiltrated by terrorist operatives and exploited 
for radicalization and recruitment, the question, as posed by Jozsef Kis-Benedek, is this: are 
terrorist groups willing and able to send their operatives into western nations?22 Kis-Benedek 
posits that while terrorist groups are able to send operatives into western nations, they are not 
inclined to do so. He argues that sending operatives to Europe or the United States is a risky and 
expensive procedure that,23 especially in the case of the Islamic State, limits the group’s ability 
to accomplish its primary objective, which is to control Iraq and Syria.24 He also argues that ISIS 
does not need to export fighters to Europe, because it actually imports converts from Europe to 
fight in Syria and Iraq.25 For example, over a two-year period, the French government was 
tracking nearly a thousand French citizens who traveled to Syria to fight with ISIS.26 Other 
European nations are seeing similar numbers of their citizens fighting with ISIS in the Middle 
East.27 Additionally, there is no shortage of lone-wolf style European nationals who are willing 
to target their own countries either on behalf of or at the direction of the Islamic state.28 For 
example, the attackers in the Paris attacks in 2015 were Belgian and French nationals.29 
However, the author does point out that while it might usually be prohibitively risky to 
send operatives into Europe from the Middle East, a situation like the migrant crisis in 2015 
would change the incentives for terrorist groups.30 During the height of the migrant crisis, 60 
million people were forced from their homes, many thousands of these migrants and refugees 
                                               
22 Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” 455. 
23 Ibid 456. 
24 Ibid, 460. 
25 Ibid, 461. 
26 Ibid, 461.  
27 Ibid, 461. 
28 Ibid, 456.  
29 Ibid, 456.  
30 Ibid, 463. 
8 
 
streamed into Europe without undergoing any significant security checks or registration.31 In this 
type of situation the risks of sending in terrorist operatives decreases significantly. If the Islamic 
State is intent on attacking Europe, as the group has proclaimed and adequately demonstrated,32 
this would have been an ideal opportunity to send in operatives.   
An additional consideration is whether the modern terrorist groups’ use of social media 
limits their need to physically enter foreign nations for recruitment and radicalization purposes. 
The Islamic State’s extensive use of social media as a propaganda tool may limit their need to 
use existing social networks among migrant communities as a stepping stone into new regions. 
In fact, ISIS recruits many followers from western nations who have little connection to ISIS 
other than through ISIS propaganda on the internet.33 Therefore, ISIS—and similar terrorist 
groups—may not be inclined to send operatives into foreign nations and use the internet instead.  
While terrorist groups may use social media effectively, it seems unlikely that groups 
engaging in an activity—terrorism—that requires high levels of trust and reliability between its 
operatives would induct members through internet transactions, sight unseen. Research shows 
that social bonds between members play the most important role in radicalization and 
recruitment.34 Given the potential for government monitoring and the uncertain nature of online 
communications, it appears unlikely that terrorist groups would recruit in foreign nations entirely 
through social media. However, if terrorist groups are recruiting primarily among migrant groups 
of similar religious, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds that would still constitute a link between 
migration from terror-prone nations and terrorism even if the interactions were mediated through 
social media.    
                                               
31 Ibid, 463.  
32 Ibid, 461.  
33 Ibid, 456. 
34 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 575. 
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As the non-European migrant “siege” of Europe continues,35 and the terrorist threat to 
Europe appears to loom larger every year,36 the question of immigration policy and the existence 
of a link to terrorism has become an increasingly important issue for the United States and 
European nations. Empirical research from 1970 to 2000 clearly shows that immigration from 
terror-prone nations leads to an increase in terrorism in previously unaffected nations.37 This 
finding is likely due to terrorists slipping in among refugee population and terrorist groups 
exploiting migrant communities as footholds for new operations and recruitment. Migrant 
radicalization is likely increased by poor economic and social opportunities in the receiving 
countries and by a lack of assimilation in general.38 However, in spite of the research to the 
contrary, debate on the relationship between terrorism and immigration has continued. One of 
the arguments that prompts this study is that Bove and Bohmelt’s findings only considered 1970-
2000 and do not apply to the modern, post 9/11 world. A similar argument is that changing world 
circumstances, including migration policies and social media, have fundamentally changed how 
terrorists recruit and decreases their need and willingness to physically enter foreign nations. If 
this claim is true it might be reflected in a changed relationship between immigration and 
terrorism since the time of Bove and Bohmelt’s research. While it is true that Bove and 
Bohmelt’s study ended before the rise of ISIS and the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe, this study 
intends to prove that, in spite of changing world circumstances, migration is still a vehicle 
through which terrorism is transplanted from terror-prone nations to other regions and nations.  
Hypothesis 
                                               
35 Ana-Maria Bolborici, "The Immigration Crisis – Reflections Concerning the Crisis of European Identity," Social 
Sciences Law 9, no. 1 (January 2016): 39. 
36 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199. 
37 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 572-588.  
38 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 193.   
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Looking at recent events, it is obvious that terrorism is a problem. Since terror attacks, 
much like any form of attack, are genuine threats to a nation’s security, correct identification of 
the source of terror becomes crucial to the protection of national interest. Politicians and political 
leaders are quick to blame terrorism on one cause or another, with foreign immigration a popular 
target. However, such reflexive decisions may be unhelpful if the cause of terrorism is 
misidentified. Therefore, wise policy decisions require an answer to the question of whether 
increases in immigration lead to increases in terrorism. The hypothesis of this research project is 
that as countries receive increased levels of asylum seekers from terror-prone nations they will 
experience a corresponding increase in the numbers of terror attacks within the nation. Our basic 
premise is that immigrant flows form a social bridge, transplanting cultures, ideologies, as well 
as individuals between the sending and receiving nations. Usually this process is benign; 
however, when the migrants originate from a terror-producing nation, they facilitate the transfer 
of latent conflicts, extremism, as well as mask the travel of terrorists, who like bandits, hide 
among the lawful population seeking asylum in the nation or city of refuge. Thus, we are seeking 
to find out if there is a strong correlation between immigration and terrorism. The null 
hypothesis, then, is that there is no correlation between immigration from terror-prone nations 
and the occurrence of terror attacks within a particular nation.  
Methodology 
Six countries were selected (Germany, Turkey, Greece, United States, Canada, and 
Australia) based on a consideration of their immigration policies, proximity to terror prone 
countries, and their popularity as the country of destination for immigrants. For example, 
Germany was chosen due to its open immigration policy and its popularity as a destination for 
immigrants in 2015. Countries like Australia and the United States were selected due to recent 
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actions taken and policies enacted to restrict or constrain immigration. Turkey and Greece were 
selected due to their very close proximity to those fleeing the Syrian crisis, while Canada was 
selected for their very tolerant stance on immigration. 
In order to examine the relationship between immigration and terrorism, it was necessary 
to locate databases with appropriate statistics. The database used to find out the Inflows of 
Asylum Seekers into each country from 2000-2015 was the International Migration Database of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The database used to find out the 
number of Terrorism Incidents in each country from 2000-2015 was the Global Terrorism 
Database. 
 After collecting the appropriate data for each country, numerous statistical tests could 
finally be run for each of the six countries. The first step was to examine whether or not there 
was a positive trend in inflows of asylum seekers from 2000-2015. The second step was to 
examine whether or not there was a positive trend in terrorism incidents from 2000-2015. After 
establishing the nature of the trend of each variable individually, a scatterplot was created for 
both variables together to examine the potential for a positive correlation. Since the number of 
inflows of asylum seekers were in the hundreds of thousands, it was necessary to scale the 
number down in order to align more with the number of terrorism incidents, which were in the 
tens and hundreds. 
Then a set of descriptive statistics were run that examined the mean and median for the 
inflows of asylum seekers (by thousands). Another set of descriptive statistics were run 
examining the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for the inflows of asylum 
seekers (by thousands). A table is also included with the Pearson’s Correlation number and 
significance between the Inflows of Asylum Seekers and Terrorism Incidents. A description of 
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the p value, degrees of freedom, critical value for a one-tailed test, r, and coefficient of 
determination are included in order to help highlight key facts that would be needed in order to 
draw conclusions from the statistics run. 
The last set of statistics run for countries was a linear regression for those countries 
where there was a very strong linear correlation between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism 
incidents. Appropriate tables are included below in the “Results” section of our study. For 
example, the ANOVA test was run and an examination of the F-test was done in order to see if 
the null hypothesis would need to be rejected. Included also are the predicted number of 
terrorism incidents for countries if the number of asylum inflows were to increase markedly. 
There is also an indication of the mean number of terrorism incidents within a 95% confidence 
and prediction interval. 
Lastly, an examination of the percent of asylum seekers in each of our six countries that 
were coming from terror-prone countries was made. There was a tool in the International 
Migration Database that allows for one to control the statistics for the country of birth/nationality 
of asylum seekers. Based on the Global Terrorism Index, the number of asylum seekers from the 
top 5 countries with the highest impact of terrorism (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and 
Syria) were examined in regard to their proportion of the total asylum seekers in each of our six 
selected countries. The results from this in-depth study of a certain variable is visually displayed 
in line graphs. 
 
Results 
Germany 
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The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in Germany. The general trend of both lines show an 
increase after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a very strong correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.901. 
 
 
 
Turkey 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in Turkey. The general trend of both lines show an increase 
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after 2013, which indicates a potential correlation between both variables. However, there was a 
marked decrease in terrorism incidents between 2012 and 2013, while there was a steady 
increase of asylum seekers into the country during that time. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a strong correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.550. 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in Greece. The general trend of both are quite different, 
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which indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of 
asylum seekers only spiked in number between 2014 and 2015. However, there has been a steady 
increase in terrorism incidents since 2010 - four years earlier. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.005. 
 
 
 
 
United States of America 
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The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in the United States of America. The general trend of both 
are markedly different, which indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is 
unlikely. The inflows of asylum seekers spiked between 2013 and 2014, but dropped back down 
between 2014 and 2015. Terrorism incidents post-9/11 decreased significantly in the U.S. and a 
steady uptick in incidents did not occur again until 2012. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.093. 
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Canada 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in Canada. The general trend of both are quite different, 
which indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. In fact, the 
graphs seem to indicate a potential negative correlation between both variables. The inflows of 
asylum seekers have decreased until experiencing a steady increase between 2013 and 2015. 
Terrorism activity in Canada has never exceeded five total incidents per year and data is sporadic 
at best.  
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak, negative correlation between inflows of 
asylum seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.061. 
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Australia 
The following two graphs compare the inflow of asylum seekers (on the left) with 
incidents of terrorism (on the right) in Australia. The general trend of both are dissimilar which 
indicates that the potential correlation between both variables is unlikely. The inflows of asylum 
seekers steadily increased from 2005 to 2012. However, terrorism incidents in Australia have 
remained relatively low during that time period. 
 
 
The scatterplot below demonstrates a weak correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents, with the key number being R2, which is 0.065. 
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Summary of Data 
As is clear from the data sets from Germany and Turkey, the strong linear relationship 
anticipated between immigration and terrorism can be present in certain conditions. Germany 
displayed the strongest correlation, such that 90% of the variance in terrorism incidents can be 
explained by the inflows of asylum seekers. Turkey’s correlation was also strong, to the point 
that 55% of the variance in terrorism incidents can be explained by inflows of asylum seekers.39 
Other than Germany and Turkey, every country shows a weak correlation between asylum seeker 
inflow and terrorism incidents. Given that the f score for Germany and Turkey exceed the critical 
value, we can say that this correlation is not due to chance. 
      The question, then, is why Germany and Turkey display these uncharacteristically 
strong correlations. Some potential variables could be proximity to terror-prone areas, the vetting 
procedures used, immigration policy, or proportion of asylum seekers from terror-producing 
                                               
39 The level of risk for this study was p = .05. 
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countries allowed in. The most likely variable to be exerting the most influence is the proportion 
of asylum seekers from terror-prone countries. Looking at this data as a percent (percentage of 
asylum-seekers coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria), it is clear that 
Germany is far above other countries in terms of accepting migrants from terror-prone areas 
since 2006. This finding would indicate that the proportion of asylum-seekers from terror-prone 
countries is a strong predictor of future terrorist activity. However, in spite of its numerous 
terrorist attacks, Turkey’s migration levels from terror prone nations have not been outside the 
normal range of the other nations considered in the study. A possible explanation for this 
phenomena is that the terror attacks Turkey has suffered are more closely related to its own 
internal policies and disputes, such as its ongoing conflict with Kurdish militant groups. It is also 
possible that its attacks are linked to its close proximity to terror-prone countries. 
 
 
Analysis of Results 
As predicted in our hypothesis, the data demonstrates that increased terrorism is linked to 
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. This connection is most clearly 
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demonstrated in the data from Germany and Turkey, both of which display a strong positive 
correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism. The terrorism-
immigration link in Germany is exceptionally strong, likely, because of its open-border policy 
during the refugee crisis of 2015, its status as a desirability location for migrants due to its 
financial success, and the its geographical proximity to terror-producing nations.  
The data from Turkey, on the other hand, has a weaker correlation between immigration 
and terrorism and a smaller portion of migrants from terror-prone nations than does Germany. 
This finding likely indicates that Turkey’s terrorism is only partially caused by immigration. The 
literature on this subject lends credence to the conclusion that terrorism in Turkey is at least 
partially influenced by its geographic proximity to terror-producing nations through the effects of 
spatial diffusion,40 as well as the ongoing conflict in neighboring Iraq and Syria. In fact, our 
hypothesis that immigration from terror-prone nations leads to terrorism in the receiving country 
is based on the assumption that migrant flows perform essentially the same function as a spatial 
link—or bridge—between nations. Where a physical, geographic link already exists, it is fair to 
conclude that the diffusion of terrorist activity and ideology would be less dependent on migrant 
flows and thus, less correlated to immigration. 
The data from the United States shows a weak correlation between immigration and 
terrorism. We posit that the United States is a natural outlier to the general pattern of correlation 
between immigration from terror-prone nations and the occurrence of terrorist activity. Thus, we 
would expect the data from the United States to neither confirm nor disprove our hypothesis due 
to its anomalous characteristics. First, we would anticipate the United States to be an outlier 
because it is intentionally targeted, regardless of immigration, by terrorist groups such as Al-
                                               
40 Ibid, 573.  
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Qaeda and the Islamic State. Terrorists, especially those of Islamic ideological backgrounds, 
purposefully target the United States beyond that experienced by almost any other westernized 
nation—with the notable exception of Israel. Second, the United States has an exceptionally 
robust migrant vetting process—enabled by its relatively remote geographical position—that 
effectively constrains the default correlation between terrorism and immigration.41 Additionally, 
the strength of American immigration controls and the physical distance between the United 
States and terrorist hubs in the Middle East likely provide significant disincentive for attempted 
terrorist infiltration. This situation is almost the exact opposite of the state of European nations 
during the refugee crisis of 2015. Middle Eastern immigrants traveled a relativity short distance, 
often over land, into a borderless Europe. The geographical proximity and the almost complete 
lack of vetting and border control created an excellent opportunity for terrorist infiltration into 
Europe.42 The United States was largely immune to the migrant crisis because of its distant 
location and firm border controls. Given these two significant departures from the global norm, 
we would expect—precisely as the data shows—that the United States would demonstrate a 
deviation from the typical relationship between immigration and terrorism. 
The data from Australia shows a weak correlation between immigration and terrorism. 
However, this finding is not unexpected given Australia’s appearance as an outlier. It is far 
removed from terror-producing nations geographically, it has limited inflows of migrants, and it 
has large areas of undeveloped land upon which migrants could settle, thus, reducing the 
potential for societal strife between migrants and native populations. Similar to the United States, 
these significant peculiarities separate Australia from the global norm. Additionally, Australia’s 
                                               
41 Kis-Benedek, “Illegal Immigration and Terrorism,” 457.  
42 Ibid, 457. 
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extremely low rate of terrorist activity limits the ability to construct meaningful analysis of its 
migrant inflows. 
The data from Greece is intriguing because they have experienced high levels of terrorist 
activity over the last several years, but, at first glance it does not appear correlated to 
immigration. It is possible that the spike in the percentage of immigrants from terror-prone 
nations in the early 2000s is an influence on the large increase in terrorist activity that occurs 
during the late 2000s, specifically beginning in 2007. However, drawing conclusions from 
Greece’s data is questionable because, though it is considered part of the westernized, civilized 
world, the nation itself has essentially been terror-prone since the 1970s. Beginning in the mid-
1970s, Greece has experienced enduring, systemic terrorist activity against their civic 
institutions.43 Most of this activity is perpetrated by revolutionary guerrilla terrorist groups 
seeking to achieve various, though uniformly leftist, political ends.44 The activity of Greece’s 
homegrown terrorist groups masks the effects of immigration and makes it difficult to discern 
how much of its 2007-2011 spike in terrorism was caused by pre-existing Greek extremism and 
how much by immigration from terror-prone nations. That being said, the peaks in terror-prone 
immigration and terrorist activity—though separated by time—are similar enough to lend 
support to the idea that immigration played a role in the increased terrorist activity. Additionally, 
the notion of a delay between the influx of migrants and increased terrorist activity is not 
unsupported. Research suggests that radicalization of migrants is related to the discontentment 
fostered by a lack of assimilation into the host nation.45 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
migrant radicalization would not occur right away. The percolation of sufficient levels of 
                                               
43 George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism,” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 132. 
44 Ibid, 138. 
45 Nicholson, “Swedish Open Immigration Policies - Correlation with Terrorism,” 199. 
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economic and social distress would take some amount of time. This concept lends weight to the 
position that increased terrorism in Greece could be related to a delayed, rather than immediate 
response to immigration from terror-prone nations.     
Meanwhile, Canada’s negative correlation between immigration and terrorism further 
reinforces our overall conclusion that it is immigration from terror-prone nations that leads to the 
spread of terrorism to new regions and not simply immigration in general that accomplishes this 
end. Existing research suggests that immigration itself is naturally negatively related to terrorism 
unless the migrants originate from a terror-prone nation or region.46 Therefore, Canada’s 
negative correlation between immigration and terrorism is exactly what one would expect if our 
hypothesis was correct given its relatively low levels of migrants from terror-prone nations.  
Conclusion 
Conflict, poverty, and adverse political environments over the last several decades have 
prompted a significant rise in international immigration. Recent reports estimate that the number 
of international migrants reaches well over 232 million.47 During roughly this same period of 
increased migration, terrorism has become an increasingly prominent and deadly phenomena. 
Whether these two factors are related is a matter of intense debate wherever individuals meet to 
discuss issues of national and international concern. 
Our research shows that, as predicted in our hypothesis, increased terrorism is linked to 
increased migration from terror-prone nations and regions. The data from Germany and Turkey 
display a strong positive correlation between asylum-seeker migration and incidents of terrorism.  
It is worth noting that immigration alone is not enough to predict a rise in terrorist attacks. The 
data from Germany, the nation with the strongest correlation between immigration and terrorism, 
                                               
46 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” 584. 
47 Ibid, 572.  
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simply indicates that migration from terror-producing areas is a strong indicator of a rise in 
terrorist incidents. This is not to say that immigration from terror-prone regions is the only factor 
giving rise to terrorism in receiving countries. Rather, immigration is only one of many factors 
that may lead to increased terrorism. However, it is our contention that immigration from terror-
producing regions is a significant predictor of increased terrorist activity. 
The conclusion that immigration from terror-prone nations is related to increased 
terrorism in the receiving country is not surprising. In fact, these results are exactly what one 
would expect given the existing research on this topic. Thus, immigration is indeed a physical 
link similar to a bridge that allows for the travel of the ideology, culture, and bandit-like terrorist 
individuals necessary for the transfer of extremism from terror-producing nations to previously 
unaffected regions. The value of this study is that it confirms and supports earlier research, 
especially that conducted by Bove and Bohmelt, and demonstrates that the correlation between 
immigration and terrorism holds notwithstanding changing world circumstances, including the 
recent immigration crisis. Additionally, this research highlights the need for discerning 
immigration policies. In terms of the potential for increased terrorist activity, immigration from 
terror-prone nation is not synonymous with immigration as a whole. A policy that misses this 
essential differentiation risks incorrectly assessing a substantial threat of additional terrorist 
activity.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Germany 
 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for Germany. The data was divided up into quartiles 
to help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .949. Further information 
critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 72.25 26.25 34.25 197.50 
Median 75.00 25.00 34.50 141.50 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 51 88 72.25 15.777 
2004-2007 4 19 36 26.25 7.805 
2008-2011 4 22 46 34.25 11.147 
2012-2015 4 65 442 197.50 168.911 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .949** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .949** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
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r = .949 
Coefficient of Determination = .901 
90% of variance accounted for 
 
Turkey 
 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for Turkey. The data was divided up into quartiles to 
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .742. Further information 
critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 4.75 5.25 11.50 62.75 
Median 4.50 4.50 11.00 66.50 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 4 6 4.75 .957 
2004-2007 4 4 8 5.25 1.893 
2008-2011 4 8 16 11.50 3.697 
2012-2015 4 26 92 62.75 32.449 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .742** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .742** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 16 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
28 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .742 
Coefficient of Determination = .551 
55% of variance accounted for 
 
Greece 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for Greece The data was divided up into quartiles to 
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .067. Further information 
critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 5.50 12.50 13.75 46.75 
Median 5.50 10.50 13.00 9.50 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 3 8 5.50 2.082 
2004-2007 4 4 25 12.50 8.963 
2008-2011 4 9 20 13.75 5.188 
2012-2015 4 8 160 46.75 75.504 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .067 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .403 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation .067 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .403  
N 16 16 
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p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .067 
Coefficient of Determination = .004 
.45 % of variance accounted for 
 
United States of America  
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for the United States of America. The data was 
divided up into quartiles to help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the 
results from the Pearson Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is 
.307. Further information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate 
table. 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 50.25 41.25 45.25 81.25 
Median 50.50 40.50 41.00 69.00 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 41 59 50.25 9.570 
2004-2007 4 39 45 41.25 2.630 
2008-2011 4 38 61 45.25 10.720 
2012-2015 4 66 121 81.25 26.550 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .307 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .123 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation .307 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .123  
N 16 16 
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p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .307 
Coefficient of Determination = .094 
9 % of variance accounted for 
 
Canada 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for Canada. The data was divided up into quartiles to 
help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is -.252. Further 
information critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 37.25 24.50 29.25 15.25 
Median 36.50 24.50 29.50 15.50 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 32 44 37.25 5.377 
2004-2007 4 21 28 24.50 3.109 
2008-2011 4 23 35 29.25 6.131 
2012-2015 4 10 20 15.25 4.573 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
 
 
Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terorrism 
Incident 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 -.252 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .174 
N 16 16 
 Terrorism Incident Pearson Correlation -.252 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .174  
N 16 16 
31 
 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = -.252 
Coefficient of Determination = .064 
6 % of variance accounted for 
 
Australia 
 
The following descriptive statistics demonstrate the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the inflows of asylum seekers for Australia. The data was divided up into quartiles 
to help streamline the process of analyzing data. Also included are the results from the Pearson 
Correlation test that was run. The key variable to note is the r, which is .249. Further information 
critical to interpreting the results is included below the appropriate table. 
 
Statistics (by thousands) 
 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 
N Valid 4 4 4 4 
Missing 12 12 12 12 
Mean 8.75 3.50 7.75 12.75 
Median 9.00 3.50 7.00 13.00 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (by thousands) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2000-2003 4 4 13 8.75 4.425 
2004-2007 4 3 4 3.50 .577 
2008-2011 4 5 12 7.75 3.096 
2012-2015 4 9 16 12.75 2.986 
Valid N (listwise) 4     
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Correlations 
 
Inflows Asylum 
Seekers 
Terrorism 
Incidents 
Inflows Asylum Seekers Pearson Correlation 1 .249 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .176 
N 16 16 
Terrorism Incidents Pearson Correlation .249 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .176  
N 16 16 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value for One-Tailed Test = .4259 
r = .249 
Coefficient of Determination = .062 
6 % of variance accounted for 
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Appendix B: Linear Regression  
Germany 
 
Because there was a very strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents for Germany, a linear regression was run in order to determine 
whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased. In addition, an f test was 
run to determine whether the differences between variables are not due to chance. If the f value 
exceeds the critical value, then we can say that the differences between inflows of asylum 
seekers and terrorism incidents are not due to chance. Relevant information for interpreting 
results are provided underneath the appropriate table. Lastly, further descriptive statistics are 
provided to round out the linear regression analysis. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .949a .901 .894 3.857 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1889.502 1 1889.502 127.027 .000b 
Residual 208.248 14 14.875   
Total 2097.750 15    
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value = 4.60 
F = 127 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 500,000) - 52 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 43 and 61 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 40 and 64 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 63 
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95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 52 and 74 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 49 and 76 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 (Constant) -1.537 1.247  -1.232 .238 -4.211 1.138 
Inflows 
Asylum 
Seekers By 
Thousands 
.108 .010 .949 11.271 .000 .087 .128 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
 
 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .51 46.17 7.38 11.223 16 
Std. Predicted Value -.611 3.457 .000 1.000 16 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
.965 3.575 1.217 .635 16 
Adjusted Predicted Value .28 22.83 5.93 6.430 16 
Residual -10.337 4.571 .000 3.726 16 
Std. Residual -2.680 1.185 .000 .966 16 
Stud. Residual -2.775 2.644 .101 1.180 16 
Deleted Residual -11.080 27.171 1.443 7.878 16 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.986 3.602 .084 1.529 16 
Mahal. Distance .001 11.949 .938 2.943 16 
Cook's Distance .000 21.319 1.368 5.321 16 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .797 .063 .196 16 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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Turkey 
 
Because there was a strong, positive linear correlation between inflows of 
asylum seekers and terrorism incidents for Turkey, a linear regression was run in order 
to determine whether the correlation would continue into 2016 if numbers increased. In 
addition, an f test was run to determine whether the differences between variables are 
not due to chance. If the f value exceeds the critical value, then we can say that the 
differences between inflows of asylum seekers and terrorism incidents are not due to 
chance. Relevant information for interpreting results are provided underneath the 
appropriate table. Lastly, further descriptive statistics are provided to round out the 
linear regression analysis. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .742a .550 .518 71.346 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
b. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 87105.112 1 87105.112 17.112 .001b 
Residual 71263.888 14 5090.278   
Total 158369.000 15    
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inflows Asylum Seekers By Thousands 
 
p <.05 
df = 14 
Critical Value = 4.60 
F = 17 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 100,000) - 274 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 160 and 388 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 83 and 465 
 
Predicted Number of Terrorism Incidents (if asylum inflows are 600,000) – 537 
95% confidence interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 290 and 784 
95% prediction interval for mean number of Terrorism Incidents – b/w 246 and 827 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
1 (Constant) 11.360 22.303  .509 .618 -36.476 59.195 
Inflows 
Asylum 
Seekers By 
Thousands 
2.630 .636 .742 4.137 .001 1.266 3.993 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 21.88 253.30 66.75 76.204 16 
Std. Predicted Value -.589 2.448 .000 1.000 16 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
18.111 48.496 23.531 9.385 16 
Adjusted Predicted Value 20.09 352.63 65.21 84.236 16 
Residual -152.783 162.698 .000 68.927 16 
Std. Residual -2.141 2.280 .000 .966 16 
Stud. Residual -2.808 3.109 .008 1.215 16 
Deleted Residual -262.625 302.433 1.536 111.312 16 
Stud. Deleted Residual -4.093 5.385 .075 1.838 16 
Mahal. Distance .029 5.993 .938 1.856 16 
Cook's Distance .000 4.151 .449 1.212 16 
Centered Leverage Value .002 .400 .063 .124 16 
a. Dependent Variable: Terrorism Incidents 
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